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Introduction 
Recent years have seen strong policy interest in ‘market based’ and ‘market like’ NRM 
policy tools, such as more efficient arrangements for funding public benefit activities. Most 
of this policy discussion and research inquiry has focused on static allocative efficiency 
issues treating resource degradation as essentially a static problem to be addressed 
within existing technologies and industry structures. However, resource degradation and 
of particular relevance, its reversal, is a dynamic efficiency issue. There are opportunities 
for innovations, which are essentially dynamic in nature, that are not directly addressed 
with current NRM policy tools. It is argued here that to some extent the NRM policy? 
problem has been framed incorrectly because beneficial landscape change requires 
innovations in the way landscapes are used and not simply adjustments in current usage.  
The purpose of this paper is to outline how resource degradation can be reversed with 
innovative investment approaches that compensate for the main impediments to beneficial 
landscape change. We argue that the existing suite of policy responses is incomplete and 
there are benefits to be had by introducing some new approaches for encouraging 
innovative and creative, appropriate landscape change.  
We discuss two  examples that address the need for instruments that target support for 
evolution of new natural resource industry niches: 
1.  the proposal advanced by the Allen Consulting Group in its recommendations to 
the Business Leaders Roundtable in 2001 on options for leveraging private 
investment entitled Repairing the Country 
2.  a pilot project that is being undertaken by Greening Australia (GA) and the CSIRO 
with funding provided under the Market Based Instruments Program of the 
National Action Plan on Salinity and Water Quality . 
The next section of this paper summarises the main natural resource management issues 
that define the Australian situation. This is followed by a discussion of Australian policy 
priorities and a summary of policy instruments. The question is then asked as to why non-
degrading commercial practices have not evolved on Australian farms. The reasons are 
discussed in the context of dynamic efficiency.  
The paper concludes with a comparison of existing instruments and their usefulness. 
 
The Landscape  
Globally, Australia is in the unique situation of being one of the driest developed countries 
with a high degree of variability in its rainfall and climatic patterns. Regionally within the 
country, the dryness and variability are particularly marked and have contributed to a 
degradation of the landscape that is compromising production potentials and becoming 
increasingly socially unacceptable. 
The source of the problem has been generally accepted to be the result of the imported 
agricultural methods and crops that are inappropriate for the climate and biophysical 
composition of the landscape. Walker et al (1999) has argued that this is a mismatch that 
has been perpetuated since development in Australia began because the geomorphology 
of Australia is different to that elsewhere. 
There have been conservation efforts undertaken here that concentrate on purchase and 
reserve options, however, it is being recognised more often now that biodiversity 
conservation, for example, cannot be achieved adequately by setting up reserves alone.  
What is needed are incentives for encouraging biodiversity conservation on private lands. Hatfield Dodds, Binning & Dyack             Leveraging Landscape Change AARES 2004  3
A solution that has been advanced by many lies in promoting the commercialisation of 
native plants and accelerating the adaptation of our commercial resource use by using 
landscapes in a sustainable way (Stirziker et al 2000, Williams, 2001, and others).  This is 
the recommendation that motivates our work on private sector incentives presented here. 
 
Policy Goals 
In 1992 the Australian government decided that all future development should be 
sustainable (National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development). Since then 
there have been two main policies aimed at sustainability: The Natural Heritage Trust 
(NHT) and the National Action Plan on Salinity and Water Quality (NAP). The $2.7 billion 
NHT was first set up by the Commonwealth in 1997 to help restore and conserve 
Australia’s environment and natural resources. The goal is to deliver important resource 
outcomes including improved water quality, less erosion, improved estuarine health, 
improved vegetation management and improved soil condition. An associated benefit is 
identified as enhanced protection and restoration of biodiversity.  
The NAP is a seven year program with $1.4 billion in funding to apply regional solutions to 
salinity and water quality problems. A recent press release extends this mandate to one 
that encourages sustainable land uses in order to conserve biodiversity, reduce salinity 
and manage water allocation within environmental limits (Joint Media Release, April 16, 
2003).  
Both programs provide funding to support investments mainly through grant programs 
with some efforts in piloting cap and trade mechanisms. Underlying these two programs 
are socio economic goals such as viable rural communities and sustainable agriculture. 
There is no one solution and there are no easy solutions. Policy makers are open to 
innovative strategies for attaining national, regional and local environmental goals. For 
example, creation of new institutions in this area was strongly endorsed by the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Heritage (HRSCEH), which 
noted ‘the problems facing Australia’s catchment systems will not be solved in a decade 
or even a quarter of a century. They will take generations to address. For this reason, 
stable, trusted institutions are required with access to stable sources of funding. For this 
reason, it is best to build upon, and extend, the stable institutional arrangements that we 
enjoy in Australia.’ (HRSCEH, 2000, p. 84). 
This paper describes two recent proposals that do not use a regulatory regime or a grant 
program as the primary mechanisms for generating landscape change in order to improve 
environmental outcomes.  The two proposals are discussed in the context of how they 
address the impediments to landscape use change and how they encourage innovations 
in the way natural resources are used. 
 
Instruments for Improving Environmental Outcomes 
The market and non market mechanisms for changing environmental outcomes are well 
studied and have been well communicated through a number of academic and 
government publications that have proliferated worldwide over the past decade. In 
Australia alone the CSIRO, the Murray Darling Basin Commission, the Productivity 
Commission, the Australian Department Environment and Heritage and the States have 
all contributed valuable advice during this time covering environmental issues on the 
ranging from the science of catchment regions, landscape mapping, the economics of 
market based instruments to regulatory options. While there is a smaller set of pilot 
projects or full-scale implementation, the theory is well documented.  
While it is true that there are many instruments that affect incentives for natural resource 
use, all of these are not reviewed here. We concentrate on the three categories of 
instruments, or incentives, which are given in Table 1. This format is useful for highlighting 
where they are most appropriately used in the remainder of the paper. The incentives are Hatfield Dodds, Binning & Dyack             Leveraging Landscape Change AARES 2004  4
categorised according to whether they are intended for funding public good provision, for 
managing scarce resources or for generating innovations in the ways commercial 
ventures are undertaken.  
 
Table 1:  Options for Altering Current Environmental Outcomes 
Option  Advantage  Examples 
Flexible Tenders  Funds provision of public goods – 
single goods or multiple outputs as 
with ecosystem services 
BushTender in Victoria 
US Conservation Reserve Program  






Arm’s Length from Government to 
encourage commercial engagement 
(In contrast to grants which are 
relatively more ‘hands on’) 
Investment tax incentives 
•  Allen Consulting Group – Repairing the 
Country recommendations 
Hybrid investment vehicles 
•  (Greening Australia’s MBI Pilot under NAP) 
‘Cap and Trade’  Tradable permits for managing 
scarce capacity 
Limit bads rather than encourage goods 
Used for development plans, some emissions 
 
 
Each mechanism has merit in specific circumstances. Tools such as the BushTender Trial 
in Victoria (Stoneham et al, 2003), the Canadian Permanent Cover Program and the 
Conservation Reserve Program in the US operate at the margin inducing change in 
management practice or withdrawal of land from use.  Tax leverage programs have the 
potential to induce changes in the way that resources are used in production.  
By far the major expenditure is on grant programs including the BushTender Trial in 
Victoria. It is estimated that less than one per cent is spent on the tax leverage vehicles, 
which includes Cap and Trade and the whole of the Market Based Instrument (MBI) trials 
of the NAP.  
Since there is a continued degradation of the environment in Australia, this begs the 
question of where is the failure and where is the potential. What is true for all policy is true 
for NRM policy as well:  successful policies match instruments to the needs of the 
situation and the best policies will follow when there is recognition of where the failure lies.  
Since current tools do not address a number of significant issues, there is room in the 
policy mix for other incentive instruments. There is room for tax incentives that address 
the need for commercial engagement in large scale, on farm innovations. Hence there is 
scope for using a suite of instruments in pursuit of NRM goals. Tax leverage has the 
power to put the decisions concerning the best investments in the hands of those making 
the investments.  
And what mix is best? The position of the ACG and the GA pilot rests on a common 
hypothesis. This is the expectation that the scale of long term change in land use may not 
follow from Cap and Trade Instruments and Grants alone because the degree of change 
needed requires extensive innovations in the way that resources are used and the crops 
that are grown. In addition, the level of grants required to induce the required amount of 
change is beyond the financing capability of the public purse alone. Private sector 
investment is required. 
Large scale change requiring innovation requires innovative policy tools that will stimulate 
the degree and type of change that is required.  Tax concessions that leverage significant 
private sector investment in development of new practices and resource niches are 
included in the options in Table 1 since our hypothesis is that what is needed is a funding 
structure that supports a major shift in investment at the firm and project level in 
environmentally sustainable land use ventures.  Hatfield Dodds, Binning & Dyack             Leveraging Landscape Change AARES 2004  5
 
Innovations and Dynamic Efficiency 
Why hasn’t there been wide scale landscape change? The key to generating sufficient 
landscape change lies in innovations in the way landscapes are used in production.  What 
is required is innovation at the farm level. This represents what Porter (1980) first 
described as growth in industries that comes from innovations in the organisation of 
business. Porter (1980) led the work on the evolution of firms and the growth that is 
generated through clustering of like firms, for example, which generates agglomeration 
economies. In this sense, the processes that evolve are new and generate expansion of 
growth possibilities that expand output and reduce average costs. This microeconomic 
growth literature runs parallel to the literature on the ‘New Economy’ that is driven by 
information and technology change and the macroeconomic literature that describes  
economic growth generated through endogenous growth processes that are similarly 
based upon information change, learning and innovation.  This process of growth is 
described as ‘dynamic’ in the sense that an evolution takes place in the way business is 
organised and this evolution leads to expanded output possibilities.  (Florida, 2001) 
This is not just about ‘not enough dollars’, it is also about what the dollars are spent on for 
the long-term wellbeing of the country’s ecosystem. Given the scale of the current and 
projected resource degradation, systemic change in the way the whole landscape is 
managed is needed.  The proposed ACG framework and the Green Bank pilot project, 
while not perfect, represent the kind of creative innovations in encouraging commercial 
engagement that is necessary.  Engaging commercial interests in financing 
environmentally sustainable land use could lead to a change in the most productive path 
for producing the joint products of agricultural output and environmental outputs at the 
level of change that is necessary.  
In order to provide a framework for comparing the policy tools, the next section outlines 
the four main reasons that there has been insufficient evolution of non-degrading 
commercial practices.  
 
Impediments to Landscape Change 
Why haven’t non-degrading commercial practices evolved on farms?  
There are four main reasons that there has been insufficient evolution of non-degrading 
commercial practices. These are: 
1.  There is poor information on best practice commercial sustainable land use mainly 
because either information does not exist or it is not communicated well. 
2.  There are risks associated with moving to new (often untried) NRM practices 
including the implementation risk associated with new ventures, moving to untried 
processes introduces significant innovation risks. 
3.  There are significant landholder liquidity and capital constraints; and 
4.  There are low private returns on investments producing public NRM benefits. 
Information 
Efficient outcomes require information exchange. Information flows are promoted by 
programs that encourage communication among stakeholders and that provide economic 
incentives to create and seek new information. This is an ongoing process that is being 
promoted by both policy (NHT and NAP) and the private goals of economic agents. 
Risk 
The risk facing enterprises contemplating investments refers to the distribution of returns 
that is associated with the investments. Risk can be split into two types. The first is 
implementation risk, which is the kind of risk facing all business including agriculture. 
These risks include those imposed by weather variation. The second is innovation risk. Hatfield Dodds, Binning & Dyack             Leveraging Landscape Change AARES 2004  6
Innovation risk arises when there is development of new technologies or production 
methods for which there is uncertainty about the commercial viability of outcomes. 
Innovation risk is the kind of risk that is facing those who seek to develop new ways of 
doing things on the land in Australia.  
Existing grants, that are static in nature, do not explicitly compensate for risk or respond to  
risk and as a result, do not necessarily encourage innovation. Even in the case where a 
grant system might be structured to identify and assess innovative changes, there is no 
guarantee that the public service officers who allocate grant funds would be able to 
encourage the most commercially viable projects. It is the contention here, that as in many 
other circumstances, the commercial sector is in the best position to choose the best 
investments. 
Landholder Equity and Capital Constraints 
The farming sector is heavily dependent on loan finance, which discourages more risky 
investments. Innovations that raise the degree of risk for farm enterprises, because they 
are untried and often generate returns over a relatively long time horizon, are effectively 
precluded when loan finance is the main form of financing ventures. This is because loan 
finance causes a given debt load to be borne regardless of the expected earnings.  In 
other words, the interest paid on the loan does not necessarily bear a relationship to the 
riskiness of the venture.   
New instruments that provide access for farm enterprises to innovation ‘venture’ funds for 
equity participation by investors have the capacity to expand farm financing opportunities, 
especially for the riskier ventures.  Equity participation allows participation of investors 
who are willing to take on greater risk of all sorts in pursuit of earnings.  However, in the 
case of loss, the investors bear the risk unlike the case of loan finance wherein the same 
loan must be repaid regardless of the losses incurred. 
Low Private Returns on NRM Investments 
In general, agricultural investments are not high return investments. Investment funds 
made available by commercial investors are inversely related to the riskiness of an 
investment and therefore, improving the expected return facing commercial investors is 
the key to encouraging investment.   
 
Effectively Leveraging Landscape Change  
The ACG report lists and describes a wide range of activities that can be invested in to 
address environmental problems and make natural resource use more sustainable. The 
examples lie within three categories: management change, such as conservation tillage; 
landuse change, such as plantations and wattle seed production; and, new supporting 
infrastructure, such as local processing plants. The changes that are required are not well 
documented because, being new and novel, they are, to a large extent, untried. Stirzaker 
et al describe what is needed in the following quotation. 
We need to develop and deploy a suite of novel landuses that are matched to 
[Australia’s] diverse climate, soils and hydrological conditions…These 
landuses, in combination, need to deliver leakage rates past the root zone that 
approach those of natural vegetation. This will require radical change to 
landuse, incorporating the development of commercially driven tree production 
systems; new farming systems made up of novel mixes of all the best current 
annual and perennial plants, the best agronomy, companion plantings, 
rotations and combinations; (and) new forms of cereals, pulses, oilseeds and 
forages selected for characteristics that substantially reduce deep drainage 
and nitrogen leakage. (Stirzaker et. al. 2000 p. 2) 
What is described here are market based mechanisms that are intended to stimulate the 
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tax based instrument and the Green Bank provides an investment vehicle for leveraging 
commercial investments. 
ACG Framework 
In the report prepared for the Business Leaders Roundtable entitled Repairing the 
Country, the Allen Consulting Group proposed a new institutional structure that is intended 
to leverage private sector investments in the sort of innovative landscape change 
discussed above. The proposal includes a recommended new structure that addresses 
each of the following; Management Change, Land Use Change and New Supporting 
Infrastructure. 
At the core of the overall proposal is a tax preferred investment vehicle that improves the 
after tax return to investors in regionally accredited sustainable land uses. The framework 
envisioned by ACG is extensive providing a whole new structure to support 
environmentally sustainable investments that effectively lowers the cost of capital to land 
managers. 
The tax measure would generate four crucial innovations in support of landscape change, 
namely: 
•  Creation of demand for and supply of information through intermediaries. 
•  Harnessing of existing tax advice base. 
•  Expansion of brokerage services that bring together the various stakeholders. 
•  Development of an institutional framework for accrediting potential land use 
proposals to meet tax guidelines.  
An integral part of the ACG proposal is a Commonwealth Land Repair Fund, which would 
be the vehicle through which the Commonwealth government could fund high priority 
environmental outcomes associated with selected private sector investments. The main 
aim would be to purchase environmental outcomes in partnership with commercial land 
and natural resource users. In addition, proposals for investments would need to be 
accredited under a system of sustainable land use plans. 
The ACG report estimates that the leverage ratio for private to public investment of 
1.0:3.5. The estimate is based on an industry survey, and a model that addresses key 
commercial risk and return issues directly through tax preferred investment vehicles and 
extended funding arrangements. With investment vehicles that reduce risk, private sector 
investment is encouraged beyond current levels and environmental goals are more likely 
to be met because the new institutional arrangements ensure that investment actually 
addresses independently verified plans formed within an integrated catchment 
management framework and national priorities.  
It is envisioned that by engaging commercial interests through the tax system, there will 
be minimal inter-jurisdictional friction. While as a general rule, the Commonwealth does 
not have Constitutional power in the area of land management, the proposed 
arrangements allow the Commonwealth to establish a framework with relatively 
streamlined links between financiers and investors through to accreditation agencies and 
land users. 
Green Bank Framework – ‘Farming Finance’ NRM Leverage Fund 
The Green Bank Framework is a Market Based Instruments pilot project proposed by 
Greening Australia and the CSIRO and to be funded by the Market Based Instruments 
Program of the National Action Plan on Salinity and Water Quality.  The purpose of the 
pilot is to assess whether a leveraging approach can deliver public good outcomes 
beyond those generated in response to the existing grants-based ‘purchaser-provider’ 
model’.  The goal is to explore whether or not there are benefits associated with a 
leverage model that are different, more cost effective or simply would not be available 
through traditional grants approaches.  As discussed above, this is an example of a 
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provides both private returns and public benefits rather than requiring ongoing public 
funding to achieve desired environmental outcomes.  
The pilot will establish a ‘social enterprise’ directed by an Investment Advisory Council 
comprising the best available financial, NRM and public policy skills, with at least $2.5 
million in private and public capital. The public portion of this is $1 million. Investments 
through the Green Fund will be in rural projects or enterprises that provide an 
‘environmental dividend’ to public and philanthropic investors, and financial returns to 
private investors.   
Unlike the ACG recommendations for tax preferred investments, the Green Bank is not an 
entitlement approach but it is an instrument that enables piloting of the leverage 
possibilities suggested in the ACG report. In particular, the business strategy of the Bank 
deliberately matches the services provided to the market failures discussed above.  
The Green Bank Proposal outlines five key strategies for addressing different types of 
market failure.  These are:     
-  Equity investments where the Green Fund provides venture capital for promising 
and innovative projects; 
-  Risk sharing where the Green Fund shares both upside and downside risk for 
projects that do not need direct financial support; 
-  Underwriting commercial finance where there is a strong business case and 
underwriting can reduce net financing costs, improving private and public returns; 
-  Integrated NRM business advice to enhance the business case for investment and 
the public benefits achieved; and, 
- Brokering  partners to improve the viability and performance of valuable new 
initiatives. 
The Investment Advisory Council will provide information, broker partnerships, evaluate 
expected NRM benefits and decide upon the best Green Bank involvement – equity 
participation, risk sharing or loan underwriting. Hence the Green Bank effectively pilots 
elements of the ACG proposal without requiring tax changes. For example, the public fund 
portion of the Green Bank parallels the ACG’s proposal for the Land Repair Fund. 
However, it is not expected that one Green Bank would be able to stimulate the scale of 
innovation required in Australia even at full scale but a number of Green Banks may be 
effective at the enterprise level. 
 
Incentive Mechanisms – the Scope for Landscape Change 
The question motivating this paper was expressed earlier as ‘Why have non-degrading 
commercial practices not evolved on farms?’ The impediments to landscape change have 
been discussed earlier.  In this section, the categories of instruments are summarised 
according to which each of these impediments is addressed when they are used. The 
analysis is summarised in Table 2 below.   
The tax leverage approach, as well as the Green Bank, addresses all four of the identified 
impediments. Clearly, there is room in the policy mix for this type of mechanism due to its 
clear focus on dealing with innovation risk and therefore has the potential to encourage 
the evolution of new natural resource industry niches. Whether or not the investments 
take place will depend on the degree to which information flows are improved and more 
importantly, the degree to which private returns are competitive given the tax advantage. Hatfield Dodds, Binning & Dyack             Leveraging Landscape Change AARES 2004  9
Table 2:  Comparison of Incentive Approaches – How are impediments to landscape 
change reduced? 
  Discretionary 
Approaches 
(eg flexible tenders) 
Entitlement        
Approaches  
(eg tax leverage) 
Market Creation 
Approaches             
(eg cap and trade) 
 
Information Flows  Asymmetric Information  
reduced 
Options clarified 
Creates demand for info 
Creates demand for info 











Risk borne by landowner 
 
Shared by investor 
Reduced if insurance 
underwritten 
 
Shared by investor and public 
sector 
 
May be shared between 
supplier and purchaser of 
traded service (or borne by 
the landowner) 
 
Usually borne by landowner 
Capital Constraints  Not addressed  Significantly Changed  May be addressed through 
brokerage arrangements 
Low Private Returns  Improved 
Offset by public support 
Expected return Improved  Returns from new markets 
 
Table 3 compares the three policy instruments from the public sector perspective. 
Entitlement approaches have the clear disadvantage of providing no built in budget limits, 
however, this drawback needs to be weighed against the potential for innovative 
landscape change.  
 
Table 3:  Comparison of Options for Altering Current Environmental Outcomes 
  Discretionary Approaches 
(eg flexible tenders) 
Entitlement Approaches 
(eg tax leverage) 
Market Creation 
Approaches 
(eg cap and trade) 
Discretion Yes  No  No 





Revenues/Costs not usually 
capped 
No 
Administration Cost  Relatively High  Relatively Low  Borne by private actors 
Focus Public  Benefit 
Mixed Benefit 
Mixed Public and Private 
Benefit 




This paper argues that existing tools do not address all the impediments to improved 
environmental flows in Australia. Achieving Australia’s NRM policy goals will require 
significant changes in commercial agricultural practice and natural resource management. 
Treating this desired transition as a dynamic efficiency issue  suggests that desired 
changes are blocked by a range of impediments, including market failures related to 
innovation and risk, and by more general issues of enterprise culture and government 
administration.  
Tax leverage and investment fund options are discussed as tools for addressing 
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•  The ACG proposal is a tax preferred investment vehicle that improves the after tax 
return to investors in profitable regionally accredited sustainable land uses.  
•  The Green Bank option advanced by Greening Australia and the CSIRO achieves 
similar policy objectives through investments in rural projects or enterprises that 
provide an ‘environmental dividend’ to public and philanthropic investors, and 
financial return to private investors.   
Investment leverage approaches have an important role to play in achieving Australian 
NRM policy objectives. The extent to which investment leverage provides a practical 
policy option for addressing ongoing landscape degradation is a judgement that requires 
testing in the marketplace. Over the next two years, the Green Bank Pilot Project should 
make a valuable contribution to our understanding in this area. 
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